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The Evolution and Performance of Groundwater Management Institutions in
Southern California
William Blomquist
Department of Political Science
Indiana University
Indianapolis, Indiana

I. Introduction
A. Various scholars and commentators either have raised the
question of whether there is groundwater management in
California, or have asserted that there is not. Their
critique is based primarily on the absence of a statewide
groundwater management statute or program.
B. In fact, groundwater management does exist in California, but
it occurs locally and therefore differs from one basin to
another, and has not yet been implemented in many basins.
C. Local basin management programs, and the basin governance
institutions that design and implement them, have been
developed over time by local water users as water problems
have emerged and been understood. These efforts are not
"comprehensive," but incremental and adaptive in keeping with
the nature and limits of human problem-solving.
D. This paper describes the development and analyzes the
performance of groundwater management institutions in eight
southern California basins. It raises and responds to the
following key questions:
1. How did these institutional arrangements come about?
2. What are their characteristics and features?
3. How well do they perform?
a. How well do they perform across several criteria?
b. Are they worth it (relative to letting the basins
go)?
c. Does the single-agency, non-adjudicated basin work
better than the multi-organizational, adjudicated
basins?
4. What can we learn from their relative successes and
failures?
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II. The Lay of the Land: The paper includes eight cases in four
watersheds, underlying most of the Los Angeles-Orange County-San
Bernardino metropolis. Four basins are in the San Gabriel River
watershed in Los Angeles County: the Raymond, Main San Gabriel,
Central, and West basins. One is in the Los Angeles River
watershed in Los Angeles County: the Upper Los Angeles River Area
(ULARA). Two are in the Santa Ana River watershed: the Orange
County basin, and the Chino Basin in San Bernardino, Riverside, and
Los Angeles counties. The remaining groundwater system is along
the Mojave River in San Bernardino County.

III. The Evolution of Basin Governance and Management Arrangements
A. Groundwater problems emerged in these basins at different times
and with differing degrees of severity, but three trends
contributed to the supply problems and the need to control
groundwater demand in all of them.
1. Development of lands for irrigated agriculture accounted
for the growth in groundwater use throughout southern
California, and several basins were at or near overdraft
by the time they began to urbanize in earnest.
2. In most southern California basins, urbanization and
population growth did not increase total water use, but
did aggravate groundwater problems by reducing return
flows and natural replenishment.
3. As large-scale water projects brought more expensive
imported water to southern California, water users faced
the problems of how to encourage pumpers to rely on
imports to meet at least some of their needs, and who
would pay for the imported supplies.
B. In the four groundwater basins of the San Gabriel River
watershed, these groundwater problems were addressed through
adjudication and limitation of rights to local water supplies,
creation of districts to pay for supplemental water supplies,
and (in three of the cases) imposition of a pump tax to
purchase imported water for basin replenishment.

1. In the relatively small Raymond Basin, the city of
Pasadena took all other pumpers to court to define their
relative rights to the local groundwater supplies. The
resulting judgment introduced the doctrine of "mutual
prescription" into California groundwater law, defining
all pumping rights as of equal priority and then
reducing them in total to the basin safe yield.
2. West Basin water users faced problems of overdraft, loss
of

freshwater replenishment from Central Basin upstream,

and saltwater intrusion from the ocean. They curtailed
pumping with a "mutual prescription" type of
adjudication of pumping rights. They acquired access to
imported water supplies through the formation of the
West Basin Municipal Water District and its annexation
to MWD. They encouraged Central Basin pumpers to begin
similar processes, and cooperated in the creation of the
Central and West Basin Water Replenishment District to
taxpumping and operate a basin replenishment program to
benefit both basins. They developed an injection-well
barrier to block saltwater intrusion.
3. Central Basin water users faced problems of overdraft,
loss of freshwater inflow from the San Gabriel Valley
upstream, and saltwater intrusion. They first acquired
access to imported water supplies through the creation
of the Central Basin Municipal Water District and its
annexation to MWD. They then initiated a suit against
upstream pumpers to guarantee flows of the San Gabriel
River through Whittier Narrows to Central Basin. They
cooperated with West Basin users in the creation of the
Central and West Basin Water Replenishment District to
operate a basin replenishment program and a saltwater
intrusion barrier. Finally, they curtailed pumping
within Central Basin with a "mutual prescription" type
of adjudication.
4. Main San Gabriel Basin water users faced problems of
overdraft, and pressure from downstream users to gain
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access to imported water supplies and restrain their
dependence on local water supplies. They responded by
creating an Upper San Gabriel Valley Municipal Water
District that annexed to MWD, then settling with the
downstream users over rights to San Gabriel River flows
through Whittier Narrows, and finally by adjudicating
pumping rights among Main San Gabriel Basin users.
C. The city of Los Angeles had asserted a "pueblo water right" to
the water supplies of the Los Angeles River and to the
groundwater supplies of the ULARA that feed the flows of the
Los Angeles River. The growing San Fernando Valley cities of
Burbank, Glendale, and San Fernando relied increasingly on the
groundwater supplies of the valley. Eventually, the four
cities were involved in an attempt to adjudicate pumping
rights throughout the ULARA. The trial judge attempted to
follow the "mutual prescription" approach of the San Gabriel
River basins, but his decision was reversed by the California
Supreme Court in 1975. The subsequent division of ULARA
waters was finalized at the trial court level in 1979.
D. In the Mojave River watershed, a water agency was formed in
1959 to acquire access to State Project water that was due to
cross the region in 1972. The agency board, a group of
upstream pumpers, and some water rights attorneys and
engineers attempted to put together a "mutual prescription"
type of adjudication of pumping rights along the river, in
anticipation of the arrival of imported water supplies. The
attempted adjudication failed after ten years, leaving much
enmity among pumpers in the area and little prospect for
fruitful cooperation.
E. In the lower area of the Santa Ana River watershed, Orange
County water users have been active in taking collective
action tO protect and enhance local water supplies since the
1930s. Upper area water users, such as those in the Chino
Basin, did not organize basin governance and management
arrangements until later, and to some degree at the stimulus
of actions taken in Orange County.

1. Orange county water users created the Orange County Water
• District in 1933 to assist with litigation against some
• upstream water users. Since then, the district has been
involved in two other adjudications against upstream
users, but Orange County water users have never
adjudicated and limited their own pumping rights.
Instead, they innovated basinwide replenishment funded
by a pump tax. Later, the Orange County Water District
also constructed a saltwater intrusion barrier project
based on a modification of the designs used in the
Central and West basins.
2. Chino Basin pumpers did adjudicate pumping rights, but
not until the California Supreme Court had ruled in the
ULARA case in ways that cast serious doubt on the
"mutual prescription" solutions devised in the San
Gabriel River watershed. Accordingly, the Chino Basin
allocation of pumping rights had to be tailored to fit
the limitations of the Supreme Court decision, as well
as the particular circumstances of the basin, which was
just beginning a rapid transition from agricultural to
urban land uses. The resulting institutional
arrangements are among the most complicated in
California and perhaps anywhere in the United States.
F. Institutional development in these basins can be viewed as an
evolutionary process, not in the biological sense of random
mutations, but in the cultural sense of "path-dependence" and
adaptation. The institutional designs from one basin to the
next built upon and were shaped by decisions taken in the
previous i basins, while at the same time considerable tailoring
was involved in fitting the institutional arrangements to the
particular circumstances of each basin and watershed.

IV. Summary of the Basin Governance and Management Arrangements: Before
analyzing their performance on several criteria, we should briefly
review the basin governance and management arrangements currently
in place in the seven managed basins.

A. The San Gabriel River watershed features four adjudicated
basins and an adjudicated river system.
1. Raymond Basin is governed by a management board composed
of pumpers' representatives. Pumpers hold fixed,
transferable rights under the provisions of the 1945
judgment. Rights total the basin safe yield, and there
is no basin-wide replenishment program.
2. West Basin pumping rights are allocated under the 1961
judgment and are fixed and transferable. The Central
and West Basin Water Replenishment District imposes a
tax on all pumping and directs the basin replenishment
and saltwater intrusion barrier programs.
3. Central Basin pumping rights are allocated under the 1965
judgment and are fixed and transferable. The Central
and West Basin Water Replenishment District imposes a
tax on all pumping and directs the basin replenishment
and saltwater intrusion barrier programs.
4. Main San Gabriel Basin pumping rights were determined in
the 1973 judgment, and are allocated as shares of the
basin's operating safe yield. The operating safe yield
is set each year by the Main San Gabriel Basin
Watermaster, a 9-member board composed of pumpers' and
districts' representatives which also regulates basin
water storage and monitors compliance with the judgment.
5. The waters of the San Gabriel River are allocated between
the upper and lower areas of the watershed by a formula
established in a 1965 judgment. The upper area
guarantees the lower area a minimum inflow of usable
water each year. A 3-member San Gabriel River
Watermaster, composed of upper area and lower area
representatives, oversees operations under the judgment.
B. CLARA groundwater is divided among parties according to the

provisions of a 1979 judgment. Those pumping rights are not
transferable. The judgment is administered by an individual
CLARA Watermaster appointed by the court, and assisted by a
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Watermaster Advisory Committee composed of pumpers'
representatives.
C. The Santa Ana River watershed contains some adjudicated and
some nonadjudicated basins.
1. Orange County groundwater supplies have not been
adjudicated. Pumpers do not have defined or
transferable pumping rights. The Orange County Water
District monitors basin water conditions and operates a
basin replenishment program funded by pump taxes. The
replenishment program replaces pumping in excess of the
basin's safe yield with imported replenishment water.
The district also operates the basin's saltwater
intrusion barrier program.
2. Chino Basin pumpers are divided into pools according to
whether their pumping is for overlying agricultural use,
overlying nonagricultural use, or appropriative use
under the terms of the 1978 judgment. Appropriators
have transferable pumping rights defined as shares in
the basin's operating safe yield. Overlying
nonagricultural pumpers have fixed, nontransferable
pumping rights. Overlying agricultural pumpers have
aggregate nontransferable pumping rights. The Chino
Basin Watermaster, assisted and advised by a Watermaster
Advisory Committee composed of pumpers' representatives,
sets the basin's operating safe yield and monitors
compliance with the 1978 judgment.
3. The waters of the Santa Ana River are allocated between
the upper and lower areas of the watershed by a formula
established in a 1968 judgment. The upper area
guarantees the lower area a minimum inflow of usable
water each year. A 5-member Santa Ana River Watermaster,
composed of upper area and lower area representatives,
oversees operations under the judgment.
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V. Institutional performance in the seven managed basins is compared
using seven performance criteria.
A. The seven performance criteria are: compliance, effectiveness,
efficiency in basin management costs, efficiency in resource
use, equity in the allocation of costs to benefits, equity in
the allocation of pumping rights, and adaptability.
B. Comparisons of the basins show high levels of performance on
all criteria, with some differences in efficiency and equity.
1. Compliance rates have been so high that no water users
has been sanctioned for violating rules, even in the
basins where management has been in place for almost 50

years.
2. All basin management programs have been effective in
halting depletion and further degradation of water
supplies.
3. Basin management costs are low compared with the
replacement cost of groundwater supplies. The lowest
costs per acre-foot are in Raymond Basin, the highest in
Orange County.
4. Basin management has preserved the groundwater basins,
transferred their use from lower- to higher-valued uses,
and taken advantage of their value as water storage and
distribution facilities. Just replacing their storage
capacity would be extraordinarily expensive. Basin
preservation has been a good bargain for southern
California.
5. For the most part, the pumpers are the greatest
beneficiaries of the basin management programs, and they
bear the costs of those programs. The basin management
programs show little evidence of "rent-seeking" behavior
or subsidization.
6. Adjudication drove out many small pumpers, but it
impossible to say how many, because the urbanization
processes that were simultaneously underway in the
adjudicated basins were also reducing the number of
small pumpers, and the number of small pumpers has
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continued to decline since adjudication. Orange County,
as the only nonadjudicated basin in this study, has the
largest number of small pumpers. On the other hand,
Orange County pumpers do not have defined, transferable
pumping rights, so small pumpers also cannot exchange
their pumping rights for anything of value.
7. All basin governance structures and management programs
have proved adaptable to changed conditions and to new
ideas about basin management. In some cases, basin
governance structures or management programs have been
modified in response to new ideas or developments. In
most cases, adaptability was built into basin governance
as a design element.

VI. Analysis and Discussion: Why do southern California water users
prefer this "chaos"
A. What can we learn from the failures and shortcomings? Most of
the failures and shortcomings in these basins relate to either
the attempt to impose an institutional "formula" for basin
management or the attempt to move too fast toward basin
management without building a consensus about the nature and
severity of water supply problems. The biggest shortcomings
of the basin management programs themselves are the failure in
most instances to adequately define rights to basin storage,
and in some cases to allocate transferable pumping rights.
B. The basin governance and management arrangements work as well
as they do because they exhibit the strengths of polycentric,
self-governing systems. They take advantage of specialization
and differences in the appropriate scale of organization for
different tasks. They are regarded as fair and worthy of
compliance because they were designed and implemented by the
water users themselves. They are closely tailored to the
individual physical, legal, and economic circumstances of each
basin. And they have generated substantial amounts of
innovation, experimentation, and learning about basin
management.
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C. These results reinforce the difficulties of approaching
groundwater management through a single statewide, regulatory
approach, No statewide management program could accommodate
the differences among basins, but more importantly, the goal
of a "comprehensive" program is unattainable: it presumes that
human beings already know everything there is to know about
groundwater basins and their management. What is needed
instead is an institutionally-rich system that sets several
minds to work on problems in Several places, and allows good
ideas to emerge even at the risk of allowing some bad ones to
be tried' as well.

